Securing mobile ad hoc network routing protocols by NG KENG SENG
















NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE 
2003 














A THESIS SUBMITTED  
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ENGINEERING 
DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING 





In preparing of this thesis, I have been fortunate to receive valuable assistance, 
suggestion, and support from my supervisor, and friends. I greatly appreciate their 
generosity in devoting their time to help me with this research.  
I would like to express my thanks to my supervisor Dr. Winston Seah Khoon 
Guan, who has guided me throughout my entire candidature as a Research Scholar at 
the Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R). I sincerely appreciate his enormous, 
innumerable pieces of advice, and insightful criticism. In addition, thanks to the 
National University of Singapore (NUS) for the Research Scholarship. 
Besides, I would also like to extend my greatest thanks to my mother, Tina Loh 
Yoke Ying, my sister, Sandy Ng Sim Yee, and my girlfriend, Frances Chia Foong Sin, 
for their caring and love. 
A very special thanks go to my close circle of friends, especially, Alvin, Yang 
Luqing, Li Feng, Wu Wei, Cheng Jing, Gao Qing, Hu Hongjie, Bijay and Luo Haihong, 
for their support, help and encouragement. 
i 
  
Table of Contents 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................... i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................. ii 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................vii 
LIST OF FLOWCHARTS........................................................................................viii 
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. ix 
CHAPTER 1 MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS ....................................................... 1 
1.1  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 CHARACTERISTICS AND CHALLENGES ............................................................. 2 
1.2.1  Network Origin ........................................................................................... 4 
1.2.2  Network Capabilities .................................................................................. 5 
1.2.3  Network Transiency .................................................................................... 5 
1.3  APPLICATIONS ................................................................................................. 5 
1.3.1  Military Tactical Networks ......................................................................... 6 
1.3.2  Personal Area Networks ............................................................................. 6 
1.3.3  Sensor Networks.......................................................................................... 6 
1.3.4  Collaborative Networking........................................................................... 7 
1.3.5  Disaster Area Networks .............................................................................. 7 
1.4 MOTIVATION.................................................................................................... 8 
1.5  OUR CONTRIBUTION ........................................................................................ 9 
1.6 THESIS ORGANIZATION.................................................................................... 9 
ii 
CHAPTER 2 NETWORK SECURITY ISSUES ..................................................... 10 
2.1  NETWORK SECURITY ..................................................................................... 10 
2.1.1  Security Services ....................................................................................... 10 
2.1.2  Security Attacks......................................................................................... 11 
2.1.3  Security Mechanisms ................................................................................ 13 
2.2  CRYPTOGRAPHY BACKGROUND..................................................................... 14 
2.2.1  Symmetric Encryption............................................................................... 14 
2.2.2  Public Key Encryption .............................................................................. 15 
2.2.3  Digital Signature....................................................................................... 17 
2.2.4  Digital Certificate ..................................................................................... 18 
2.2.5  Secret Sharing........................................................................................... 19 
2.3  SECURITY ISSUES IN AD HOC NETWORKS ...................................................... 22 
 
CHAPTER 3 SECURITY IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS.......................... 23 
3.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 23 
3.2  RELATED WORK ............................................................................................ 25 
3.2.1 Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing in Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc 
Networks ................................................................................................... 25 
3.2.2  Secure Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks............................................ 27 
3.2.3 Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks. 28 
3.2.4  Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks............................................ 29 
3.2.5  Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing .............................. 30 
 
CHAPTER 4 THE SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL (SEROP) FOR MOBILE 
AD HOC NETWORKS ...................................................................... 33 
iii 
4.1 OPERATION OF CHAMP ................................................................................ 33 
4.2 THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL - SEROP............................................................. 36 
4.2.1 Assumptions .............................................................................................. 36 
4.2.2 Distribution of Key.................................................................................... 37 
4.2.3 Route Discovery Request .......................................................................... 38 
4.2.4 Route Reply ............................................................................................... 40 
4.2.5 Intermediate Node Reply........................................................................... 41 
4.2.6 Route Maintenance & Deletion ................................................................ 43 
4.2.7 Key Revocation ......................................................................................... 45 
4.3 REASONING LOGIC ........................................................................................ 46 
4.4 APPRAISAL OF SEROP................................................................................... 51 
 
CHAPTER 5 SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS...................................................... 55 
5.1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 55 
5.2 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION......................................................................... 56 
5.3 SIMULATION SETUP ....................................................................................... 57 
5.4 SIMULATION RESULTS FOR BENIGN NETWORK.............................................. 58 
5.5 SIMULATION RESULTS FOR MALICIOUS NETWORK ........................................ 76 
5.6  SUMMARY...................................................................................................... 80 
 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK ........................................ 81 
6.1  CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 81 
6.2  LIMITATION ................................................................................................... 82 
6.3  FUTURE WORK............................................................................................... 82 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 83 
iv 
  
List of Figures 
 
1.1  Wireless Ad hoc Network............................................................................... 1 
2.1 Symmetric Encryption Scheme..................................................................... 14 
2.2 Public Key Encryption Scheme .................................................................... 15 
2.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange ..................................................................... 16 
2.4 Example of a Digital Signature..................................................................... 18 
2.5  X.509 Certificate Format .............................................................................. 19 
4.1 Route Discovery Request ............................................................................. 39 
4.2 Route Reply ................................................................................................. 42 
4.3 Intermediate Node Reply .............................................................................. 44 
4.4 Route Maintenance & Deletion ................................................................... 46 
4.5  Overall Picture of the Protocol .................................................................... 47 
4.6  The Protocol is Observed as an Exchange of Two Control Messages ......... 48 
5.1a Packet Delivery Ratio vs Pause Time........................................................... 59 
5.1b Packet Delivery Ratio vs Pause Time........................................................... 60 
5.2a Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Sources............................................... 61 
5.2b Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Sources............................................... 62 
5.2c Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Sources............................................... 63 
5.2d Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Sources............................................... 64 
5.3a End-to-end Delay vs Pause Time.................................................................. 65 
5.3b End-to-end Delay vs Pause Time.................................................................. 66 
5.4a End-to-end Delay vs Number of Sources ..................................................... 67 
v 
vi 
5.4b End-to-end Delay vs Number of Sources ..................................................... 68 
5.4c End-to-end Delay vs Number of Sources ..................................................... 69 
5.4d End-to-end Delay vs Number of Sources ..................................................... 70 
5.5a Normalized Routing Overhead vs Pause Time............................................. 71 
5.5b Normalized Routing Overhead vs Pause Time............................................. 72 
5.6a Normalized Routing Overhead vs Number of Sources................................. 73 
5.6b Normalized Routing Overhead vs Number of Sources................................. 74 
5.6c Normalized Routing Overhead vs Number of Sources................................. 75 
5.7  Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Malicious Nodes (Malicious Route 
Request) ......................................................................................................... 77 
5.8 Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Malicious Nodes (Malicious Route 
Reply)............................................................................................................. 77 
5.9 End-to-end Delay vs Number of Malicious Nodes (Malicious Route Request)
 ....................................................................................................................... 78 
5.10 End-to-end Delay vs Number of Malicious Nodes (Malicious Route Reply) ..
 ....................................................................................................................... 79 
5.11  Byte Overhead vs Number of Malicious Nodes (Malicious Route Request) ...
 ....................................................................................................................... 79 




List of Tables 
 
4.1  Table of Notation .......................................................................................... 37 
4.2  Table of Statement ........................................................................................ 49 
5.1 Simulation Parameters .................................................................................. 58 
vii 
  
List of Flowcharts 
 
4.1  Route Discovery Request ............................................................................. 40 
4.2 Route Reply ................................................................................................. 41 
4.3 Intermediate Node Reply .............................................................................. 45 






Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are made up of autonomous, 
collaborative mobile nodes with the ability to self-organize dynamically. Multi-hop 
routing capability is required for each node that wants to set up a connection with 
another node not in its radio range. An ad hoc network is essential in circumstances 
where the terrestrial restrictions require an entirely distributed network system without 
any permanent base stations. 
Security is a critical issue for MANET, particularly for security-sensitive 
applications. However, security mechanisms for traditional networks are not wholly 
valid in MANET. Network operation can be easily jeopardized if the security schemes 
are not designed concurrently with the basic protocols. The spontaneous creation of the 
ad hoc networks makes it very difficult to differentiate between trusted and non-trusted 
nodes. An ad hoc network is dynamic because the nodes may leave and join the 
network anytime they wish. Consequently, the trust relationships between nodes 
change regularly as well. Any recommended security mechanisms with fixed 
arrangements would not be adequate. It is advantageous that the security solutions are 
capable of adapting on the fly to those changes and are scalable to handle a large 
network. 
Our proposed protocol, Secure Routing Protocol (SEROP), is a hybrid 
cryptosystem that uses asymmetric key algorithm to establish secure routing between 
nodes and uses symmetric key algorithm to provide confidentiality of the data 
transmitted over the network. The protocol satisfies the fundamental aspects of 
ix 
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security like confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. The 
protocol provides confidentiality not merely for routing information, but also for data 
messages. The originator of the message is able to encrypt the data packet with the 
secret key, which is shared among the sender and the intended recipients. The key 
exchange technique used in generating this shared secret key is based on the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange. Reliance on this algorithm enables our protocol to approach 
forward secrecy.  
SEROP presents a new approach to securing route discovery operation for 
mobile ad hoc network routing protocols. Any control message that does not 
correspond to the current pending request will be discarded by nodes along the source-
destination path. The basis of our protocol is based on the broadly accepted route 
discovery processes by broadcasting route request packet, hence it enables our protocol 
to be an extension that can be easily adapted to reactive routing protocols. 
For simulation implementation in both benign and malicious networks, we base 
our protocol, SEROP, on the basic operation of the Caching and Multi-Path (CHAMP) 
[1] routing protocol.  The performance of SEROP in benign network is encouraging. It 
produces high packet delivery rate, low end-to-end delay and reasonable routing 
overhead. Besides that, the SEROP protocol is able to function and to perform well in 
the present of malicious nodes up to as high as 50%. SEROP can therefore be 
considered as an efficient and practical security extension that does not significantly 




Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
 
This chapter introduces Ad hoc networking and describes their salient features. 
It then discusses some of the challenging issues in these networks.  
 
1.1  Introduction 
 Ad hoc networking is a networking paradigm for mobile, self-organizing 
networks. Typically, the network nodes are interconnected through wireless interfaces 
and unlike traditional networks lack specialized nodes, i.e. routers, that handle packet 
forwarding. Instead, every node in the network functions as a router as well as an 
application node and forwards packets on behalf of other nodes. Figure 1.1 shows such 
an example in which node A is not within reach of node C, however by using node B 
as an intermediate node, A and C are able to communicate. 





 Figure 1.1 Wireless Ad hoc Network 
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Ad hoc networks have the ability to form on the fly and dynamically handle the 
joining or leaving of nodes in the network. For example, when three people with ad 
hoc networking enabled Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) come within 
communication range of each other. The three PDAs can then automatically create an 
ad hoc network used to exchange data. 
In many, if not most ad hoc networks, the nodes will also be mobile and they 
can then be termed mobile ad hoc networks, or MANET. The idea of MANETs is to 
incorporate routing functionality into mobile nodes in order to support robust and 
efficient operation in mobile wireless networks. Such networks are envisioned to have 
dynamic, rapid by changing, random, multi-hop topologies which are likely to be made 
up of relatively bandwidth-constrained wireless links. Multi-hop routing capability is 
essential for each node when the node needs to set up a connection with another node 
that is not in its radio range. The responsibility of network management is completely 
on the nodes even though they have unlimited mobility and connectivity. An ad hoc 
network is essential in circumstances where the terrestrial and geographical restrictions 
require an entirely distributed network system without any permanent base stations. 
 
1.2 Characteristics and Challenges 
When designing protocols for ad hoc networks, whether it be routing protocols 
or security protocols it is important to consider the characteristics of the network and 
realize that there are many flavours of ad hoc networks. 
Mobile ad hoc networks generally have the following characteristics [5]: 
 Dynamic network topology: The network nodes are mobile and thus the 
topology of the network may change frequently. Nodes may move 
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around within the network but the network can also be partitioned into 
multiple smaller networks or be merged with other networks. 
 Limited bandwidth: The use of wireless communication typically 
implies a lower bandwidth than that of traditional networks. This may 
limit the number and size of the messages sent during protocol 
execution. 
 Energy constrained nodes: Nodes in ad hoc networks will most often 
rely on batteries as their power source. The use of computationally 
complex algorithms may not be possible. This also exposes the nodes to 
a new type of denial of service attack, the sleep deprivation torture 
attack [13], that aims at depleting the nodes energy. 
 Limited physical security: The use of wireless communication and the 
exposure of the network nodes increase the possibility of attacks against 
the network. Due to the mobility of the nodes, the risk of them being 
physically compromised by theft, loss or other means will probably be 
greater than traditional network nodes. 
In many cases, the nodes of the ad hoc network may also have limited CPU 
power and memory, e.g. low-end devices such as PDAs, cellular phones and embedded 
devices. As a result certain algorithms that are computationally or memory expensive 
might not be applicable.  
Besides the characteristics mentioned above that are due to the nature of ad hoc 
networking the following aspects that depend more on the application should also be 
considered. 
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 Network origin: spontaneous vs. planned. Spontaneous: nodes with no 
prior relationship. Planned: nodes with a prior relationship, e.g. 
belonging to the same company, military unit etc. 
 Node capabilities: uniform vs. diverse. Uniform: all nodes have 
approximately the same capabilities in terms of power source, CPU 
performance and memory size etc. Diverse: the nodes’ capabilities 
differ significantly, certain nodes may be high-end computers while 
other are e.g. embedded devices. 
 Network transiency: short term vs. long term. Short term: nodes come 
together to form an ad hoc network, and after the session has finished, 
no knowledge is retained about the other nodes. These networks 
typically only persist for a relatively short time period, i.e. less than a 
few hours. Long term: the same nodes will probably be part of the same 
ad hoc network multiple times and therefore save information about the 
other nodes for future use. These networks will persist for a longer time 
period. This also includes short-lived ad hoc networks that are created 
frequently. 
Each of the aspects mentioned above will now be discussed with regard to how 
they affect the implementation of security services. 
 
1.2.1  Network Origin 
This aspect effects what assumptions or prerequisites that can be made on the 
nodes in the network. E.g. if it is a planned ad hoc network, it can perhaps be assumed 
that the nodes can be supplied with some initial data structures such as certificates, 
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passwords, user names etc. However, if the network is spontaneous no such 
assumptions can be made. 
 
1.2.2  Network Capabilities 
If the capabilities of the nodes in the network are diverse, certain techniques 
may not be directly applicable. A certain technique may be applicable to a subset of 
the nodes but completely unusable on the rest of the nodes. An example of this could 
be the use of public key cryptography; although this is not an issue for high-end CPU’s 
it may not be feasible for embedded devices. 
 
1.2.3  Network Transiency 
The longevity of the ad hoc network may influence the allowed complexity of 
some initialization phase. E.g. for a network consisting of nodes that will frequently 
join in an ad hoc network, it may be tolerable with a more complex initialization phase 
may be more tolerable than that of a network that will only last for a short time and 
will not recur. 
 
1.3  Applications 
To motivate the development of ad hoc networking protocols, there needs to be 
applications where the properties of ad hoc networking are beneficial. This section will 
discuss some such applications. Although some of these applications have been 
implemented many are still in the early research phase. 
 
5 
1.3.1  Military Tactical Networks 
The first application of ad hoc networking was in the military domain. Ad hoc 
networking enables battlefield units to communicate anywhere and anytime, without 
the requirement of any fixed infrastructure. The fact that every node forwards packets 
also provides for a robust network. The loss of any one unit will not disrupt the 
network since there will be other units that can still provide packet forwarding services. 
Examples of military applications are the Tactical Internet [24] and the Saab 
NetDefence concept [25]. 
 
1.3.2  Personal Area Networks 
The concept of personal area networks is about interconnecting different 
devices used by a single person, e.g. a PDA, cellular phone, laptop, and etc. In this 
case, the PDA or the laptop will connect with the cellular phone in an ad hoc fashion. 
The cellular phone can then be used to access Internet. Another example could be 
when a person holding a PDA comes within communication range of a printer. If both 
the PDA and the printer were ad hoc enabled, the PDA could automatically get access 
to the printing services. 
 
1.3.3  Sensor Networks 
Sensor networks [26] are ad hoc networks consisting of communication 
enabled sensor nodes. Each node contains one or more sensors, e.g. movement-, 
chemical- or heat sensors. When a sensor is activated, it relays the obtained 
information through the ad hoc network to some central processing node where further 
analysis and actions can be performed. Such sensor networks may consist of hundreds 
or thousands of sensors and can be used in both military and non-military applications, 
6 
e.g. surveillance, environmental monitoring, etc. Sensor networks differ significantly 
from the other types of ad hoc networks described in this section. The most significant 
difference is the small size, extremely limited power resources and processing power 
of the sensor nodes. 
 
1.3.4  Collaborative Networking 
This application of ad hoc networking may be the most intuitive. The simplest 
example is when a group of people are attending a meeting and need to share 
information between their laptops or PDAs. If these devices were ad hoc enabled they 
could dynamically set up a network consisting of the meeting participants and thus 
enable the sharing of the information. Without ad hoc networking, a great deal of 
configuration and setup would be required to accomplish this task. 
 
1.3.5  Disaster Area Networks 
Ad hoc networking allows for the quick deployment of a communication 
network in areas where no fixed infrastructure is available or where the fixed 
infrastructure has been destroyed by natural disasters or other events. Thus, such 
networks could be used to improve the communication among rescue workers and 







 MANET are characterized by decentralized network administration, i.e. each 
node acts both as host and router, and forwards packets for nodes that are not within 
transmission range of each other. Security in MANET is an essential component for 
basic network functions like packet forwarding and that network operation can be 
easily jeopardized if countermeasures are not embedded into basic network functions 
at the early stages of their design. Unlike networks using dedicated nodes to support 
basic functions like packet forwarding, routing, and network management, in ad hoc 
networks those functions are carried out by all available nodes. This very difference is 
the core of the security problems that are specific to ad hoc networks. As opposed to 
dedicated nodes of a classical network, the nodes of an ad hoc network cannot be 
trusted for the correct execution of critical network functions. 
If an a priori trust relationship exists among the nodes of an ad hoc network, 
entity authentication would be sufficient to assure the correct execution of critical 
network functions. A priori trust can only exist in a few special scenarios like military 
networks and requires tamper-proof hardware for the implementation of critical 
functions. Entity authentication in a large network on the other hand raises key 
management requirements. If tamper-proof hardware and strong authentication 
infrastructure are not available, the reliability of basic functions like routing can be 
endangered by any node of an ad hoc network. No classical security mechanism can 
help counter a misbehaving node in this context. The correct operation of the network 
requires not only the correct execution of critical network functions by each 
participating node but it also requires that each node performs a fair share of the 
functions. The latter requirement seems to be a strong limitation for wireless mobile 
nodes whereby power saving is a major concern. 
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1.5  Our Contribution 
 The salient natures of ad hoc networks render them vulnerable to numerous 
types of security attacks. The dynamic feature of ad hoc networks makes enforcement 
of security an extremely challenging task. The main problem of ad hoc networks is that 
many proposed routing protocols are critical susceptibilities to security attacks. 
Effective operation of ad hoc networks depends on the maintenance of correct routing 
information of the network. Nevertheless, securing routing protocols without securing 
network transmissions is not enough. As a result, our major focuses are to secure the 
routing protocol and likewise to protect data transmission. In this thesis, we present the 
Secure Routing Protocol (SEROP) [10], which helps in achieving data confidentiality 
and securing the routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks without demanding any 
unrealistic assumptions. 
 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
 The thesis is structured into six chapters as follows. Chapter two discusses the 
security issues involved in networks. Chapter three provides an introduction to 
MANET security and presents related work. Chapter four presents the proposed Secure 
Routing Protocol (SEROP). Chapter five discusses the simulation results. Finally, we 
state our conclusions in chapter six after presenting the limitations and future 









Network Security Issues 
 
This chapter provides the background information needed to understand the 
problems and the suggested solution. As our aim is to perform secure routing in ad hoc 
networks, we need to understand the security issues in a network.  
 
2.1  Network Security 
When discussing network security, three aspects can be covered; the services 
required, the potential attacks and the security mechanisms.  
The security services aspect includes the functionality that is required to 
provide a secure networking environment while the security attacks cover the methods 
that could be employed to break these security services. Finally the security 
mechanisms are the basic building blocks used to provide the security services. 
 
2.1.1  Security Services 
In providing a secure networking environment, some or all of the following 
services may be required [19]: 
 Confidentiality: Ensures that transmitted information can only be 
accessed by the intended receivers. 
 Authentication: Allows the communicating parties to be assured of the 
others identity. 
10 
 Integrity: Ensures that the data has not been altered during transmission. 
 Non-repudiation: Ensures that parties can prove the transmission or 
reception of information by another party, i.e. a party cannot falsely 
deny having received or sent certain data. 
 Availability: Ensures that the intended network services are available to 
the intended parties when required. 
Depending on the capabilities of any potential attacker, different mechanisms 
may be used to provide the services above. 
 
2.1.2  Security Attacks 
Security attacks can be classified in the following two categories [19] 
depending on the nature of the attacker: 
 Passive attacks: The attacker can only eavesdrop or monitor the 
network traffic. Typically this is the easiest form of attack and can be 
performed without difficulty in many networking environments, e.g. 
broadcast type networks such as Ethernet and wireless networks. 
 Active attacks: The attacker is not only able to listen to the transmission 
but is also able to actively alter or obstruct it. 
Furthermore depending on the attackers’ actions, the following subcategories 
can be used to cover the majority of attacks. 
 Eavesdropping: This attack is used to gain knowledge of the transmitted 
data. This is a passive attack which is easily performed in many 
networking environments as mentioned above. However, this attack can 
be easily prevented by using an encryption scheme to protect the 
transmitted data. 
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 Traffic analysis: The main goal of this attack is not to gain direct 
knowledge about the transmitted data, but to extract information from 
the characteristics of the transmission, e.g. amount of data transmitted, 
identity of the communicating nodes etc. This information may allow 
the attacker to deduce sensitive information, e.g. the roles of the 
communicating nodes, their position etc. Unlike the previously 
described attack this one is more difficult to prevent. 
 Impersonation: Here the attacker uses the identity of another node to 
gain unauthorized access to a resource or data. This attack is often used 
as a prerequisite to eavesdropping. By impersonating a legitimate node 
the attacker can try to gain access to the encryption key used to protect 
the transmitted data. Once this key is known by the attacker, the 
eavesdropping attack can be carried out. 
 Modification: This attack modifies data during the transmission 
between the communicating nodes, implying that the communicating 
nodes do not share the same view of the transmitted data. An example 
could be when the transmitted data represents a financial transaction 
where the attacker has modified the transaction value. 
 Insertion: This attack involves an unauthorized party, who inserts new 
data claiming that it originated from a legitimate party. This attack is 
related to that of impersonation. 
 Replay: The attacker retransmits data previously transmitted by a 
legitimate node. 
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 Denial of service: This active attack aims at obstructing or limiting 
access to a certain resource. This resource could be a specific node, 
service or the whole network. 
 
2.1.3  Security Mechanisms 
Most of the security services previously mentioned can be provided using 
different cryptographic techniques. The following subsections give an overview of 
which techniques are used to provide each of the services. 
 Confidentiality: The confidentiality service can be of two different 
types. The most common type of confidentiality requirement is that 
transmitted information should not be exposed to any unauthorized 
entities. A stricter confidentiality requirement is that the very existence 
of the information should not be revealed to any unauthorized entities. 
The first type of confidentiality requirement only requires protection 
from eavesdropping attacks and can be provided using an encryption 
scheme. The stricter requirement implies that the service must also 
provide protection against traffic analysis. Such a service will typically 
require additional mechanisms along with some encryption scheme. 
 Integrity: The integrity service can be provided using cryptographic 
hash functions along with some form of encryption. When dealing with 
network security, the integrity service is often provided implicitly by 
the authentication service. 
 Authentication: Authentication can be provided using encryption along 
with cryptographic hash functions. 
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 Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation requires the use of public key 
cryptography to provide digital signatures. Along with digital signatures 
a trusted third party must be involved. 
 Availability: The availability is typically ensured by redundancy, 
physical protection and other non cryptographic means, e.g. use of 
robust protocols. 
 
2.2  Cryptography Background 
2.2.1  Symmetric Encryption 
Symmetric encryption is illustrated in figure 2.1. The plain text message m is 
encrypted using the shared key k, resulting in the cipher text c. To recover the plain 
text message the cipher text is decrypted using the same key used for the encryption. 
Symmetric encryption schemes can be used to provide confidentiality, integrity and 















2.2.2  Public Key Encryption 
Unlike conventional encryption schemes where the involved parties share a 
common encryption/decryption key, public key encryption schemes depend on the use 
of two different but mathematically related keys. One of the keys is used for 
encryption and the other for decryption. The public key encryption scheme is 
illustrated in figure 2.2. Bob generates a pair of keys, his public/private key pair 
pkBob/skBob. The public key is related to the private key, but in such a way that the 
private key cannot be derived from it without additional information. 
If Alice wants to send an encrypted message to Bob, she first needs to obtain 
his public key. As the name implies Bob’s public key does not need to be kept secret, 
however it must be authenticated, i.e. Alice must be assured that the public key she 
believes belongs to Bob is really his.  
Once Alice has Bob’s authentic public key pkBob, she encrypts the plain text 
message m using it. The resulting cipher text c can then only be decrypted using Bob’s 
private key skBob which only Bob knows. 
 
Alice Bob 






Figure 2.2 Public Key Encryption Scheme  
Compared with symmetric encryption, public key encryption has a less 
stringent requirement for the communication channel over which the key distribution 
is performed. Public key encryption only requires an authenticated channel as opposed 
to a secure channel that is required for the distribution of symmetric encryption keys. 
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Public key encryption can also provide non-repudiation along with confidentiality, 
integrity and authentication. However, public key encryption requires much more 
computational resources than symmetric encryption and therefore has much lower 
performance. Consequently, public key encryption is typically used to encrypt only 
small amounts of data, e.g. symmetric encryption keys and digital signatures. 
 
Diffie-Hellman 
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm was the first public key algorithm 
published. However, it is limited to securely exchanging keys that can subsequently be 
used to provide the security services mentioned above. 
The DH algorithm, illustrated in figure 2.3, requires two public parameters, a 
prime p and a generator g of Zp. A generator of Zp is an integer g such that g, g2, ..., gp-
1(mod p) generate the values 1 through p - 1 in some order. To exchange a shared key 
Alice and Bob generate the random secrets xAlice and xBob. Bob then sends yBob = gXBob 
mod p to Alice and Alice sends yAlice = gXAlice mod p to Bob. Alice and Bob can then 
generate the shared secret key k as: 
k = (yAlice)XBob = (yBob)XAlice = gXBob.XAlice(mod p) 
 
yBob = gXBob mod p 
yAlice = gXAlice mod pAlice Bob  
 
k = (yBob)XAlice mod p k = (yAlice)XBob mod p 
 





RSA is a public key encryption algorithm that can be used to provide 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation services. To encrypt a 
message m or decrypt a cipher text c, the following calculations are performed: 
c = me mod n 
m= cd mod n = med mod n 
If the algorithm is intended to be used to provide confidentiality, the values n and e are 
made publicly known while d is kept secret, viz the public key pk = {e, n} and the 
private key sk = {d, n}. For user A to encrypt a message intended for user B, B’s 
public key pkB is used for the encryption, c = EpkB (m) = me mod n. Since only B has 
knowledge of the secret key skB  it alone can decrypt the cipher text and recover the 
plain text, m = DskB (c) = cd mod n. 
 
2.2.3  Digital Signature 
A digital signature is a data structure that provides proof of origin, i.e. 
authentication and integrity, and depending on how it is used, it can also provide non-
repudiation. Figure 2.4 illustrates how a digital signature is used. Alice wants to send a 
message to Bob, however she does not want it to be modified during transmission and 
Bob wants to be sure that the message really came from Alice. What Alice does is that 
she signs on the digest of the message using her private key skAlice. She then sends both 
the message and the signed digest which is her signature. Bob can then verify the 
signature by computing the hash digest of the message he received and comparing it 
with the digest he gets when verifying the signature using Alice’s public key pkAlice. If 
the digests are equal, Bob knows that Alice sent the message and that it has not been 









 ah4d = VpkAlice (a) 
Hash Function 
a = SskAlice (ah4d)
ah4d 
Hash Function 
m = transfer S$100 from  
       account ABC 
m = transfer S$100 from  
       account ABC 
 Figure 2.4 Example of a Digital Signature
 
2.2.4  Digital Certificate 
Public key cryptography is very useful, but in the presence of active attackers a 
problem arises. Consider the following, Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob, 
so she encrypts the message using Bobs public key pkBob that she has retrieved from a 
server. However, the key that Alice retrieved actually belongs to an attacker. The 
secret message which was intended for Bob can now be decrypted and read by the 
attacker. Digital certificates are used to prevent this type of attack.  
Basically a digital certificate is a statement issued by some trusted party saying 
that it verifies that the public key pkA in fact belongs to the user A. The trusted party 
digitally signs this statement and therefore anyone with the authentic public key of the 
trusted party can verify the certificate and thereafter use pkA and be sufficiently sure 
that it actually belongs to node A. 
Figure 2.5 shows the information in an X.509 certificate. The serial number is 
used to uniquely identify the certificate, and issuer name is the name of the trusted 
party who has issued the certificate. The validity field specifies how long the 
certificate is valid. The subject is the entity being identified by the certificate, i.e. the 
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entity whose public key is being certified. The next two fields contain the public key 
being certified and information about what it is certified to be used for (e.g. encryption, 
signatures etc.). The extensions field can be used to specify any additional information 
about the certificate. The signature field contains the certificates signature along with 



















 Figure 2.5 X.509 Certificate Format
 
2.2.5  Secret Sharing 
Secret sharing allows a secret to be shared among a group of users (share 
holders) in such a way that no single user can deduce the secret from his share alone. 
Only by combining (a sufficient number of) the shares can the secret be reconstructed. 
A secret sharing scheme where k out of n share holders are needed to reconstruct the 
secret is referred to as a (k, n) threshold scheme. 
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Shamir’s Secret Sharing 
This (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme proposed by Adi Shamir [27] is 
based on polynomial interpolation and works as follows. The secret S is to be shared 
among the n shareholders identified by idi, i = 1, ..., n. The following steps are 
performed by the dealer who is the trusted party responsible for generating the secret 
and distributing it to the users: 
1. A prime p is chosen such that p > max (S, n). 
2. A polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x + … + ak-1xk-1 is generated where a0 = S 
and ai, i = 1, …, k-1 are chosen randomly from Zp. 
3. The shares Si, i = 1, ..., n are generated as Si = f(idi)(mod p). 
4. The shares are securely distributed to the respective shareholders. 
To reconstruct the secret Lagrange interpolation is used. With the knowledge of 
a minimum of k shares the polynomial f(x) can be reconstructed and the secret 






















 It is important that no shareholder gains knowledge of any share other than his 
own. Otherwise he could potentially gain knowledge of k shares and then be able to 
reconstruct the secret himself. Therefore a trusted party is needed to perform the 
reconstruction of the secret, i.e. the shareholders provide their shares to the trusted 





Proactive Secret Sharing 
In the secret sharing scheme described above the secret is protected by 
distributing it among several shareholders. However, given sufficiently long time an 
attacker could compromise k shareholders and obtain their shares, thereby allowing 
him to reconstruct the secret. To defend against such attackers proactive secret sharing 
schemes update the shares on a regular basis. An attacker must then compromise k 
shareholders between the updates since only k shares belonging to the same update 
period can be used to reconstruct the secret. 
 The share update is achieved by adding a random update polynomial  
to the original sharing polynomial f(x) as follows: 
)(xfupdate



























 The update shares  can then be calculated as  where i . 
However, in practice it is enough to calculate the share of the update polynomial, 
updatediS , )( inew idf k,...,1
kiS i ,...,1  and securely distribute them to the respective shareholders. Each 
shareholder then adds it to it original share to obtain the updated share, i.e. 





Verifiable Secret Sharing 
If any shareholder wishes to prevent the reconstruction of the secret, he can 
provide an invalid share, e.g. a random value, to be used for the reconstruction. The 
Lagrange interpolation will then result in the reconstruction of a value , different 
from the secret S. Verifiable secret sharing mechanisms are used to prevent this type of 
denial of service attack. 
Sˆ
The mechanism works as follows: 
1. Prior to distributing the shares to the shareholders, the dealer publishes 
ga(0), ga(1), …, ga(k-1) that are witnesses of the coefficients of the sharing 
polynomial. 
2. Each node can then upon receiving its share verify it by checking that 
gS(i) = ga(0) . (ga(1))id(i) . … . (ga(k-1))id(i)^(k-1) 
 
2.3  Security Issues in Ad hoc Networks 
The nature of ad hoc networks makes them vulnerable to various forms of 
attack. Wireless networks are typically much easier to snoop on as only physical 
proximity is required to gain access to the medium. The impromptu nature of the ad 
hoc network formation makes it hard to distinguish between trusted and non-trusted 
nodes. In the most general form, nodes may leave and join the network at will. Due to 
the dynamic nature of ad hoc networks, the trust relationship between nodes also 
changes. Any security solution with static configuration would not suffice. It is 
desirable that the security mechanisms adapt on-the-fly to those changes. They should 
also be scalable to handle large networks. The random nature of these networks makes 





Security in Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to MANET security. It then briefly 
discusses the related works.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Research in security for ad hoc networks is in the early stages of development. 
With relatively few security schemes proposed for ad hoc networks, threshold schemes 
have been frequently suggested for improving the security of mobile networks where 
the nodes have relatively poor physical protection. Zhou and Haas [12] have proposed 
the use of threshold scheme as a mechanism for rendering security to the network. 
Nevertheless, threshold scheme can effortlessly lead to the denial of service although it 
obviously improves the security of the system. Denial of service attacks essentially 
intimidates the operation in all kinds of networks and it is unfeasible to prevent this 
type of attack in general. Prompt decision-making and corrective-action are often more 
important than protection against compromised nodes in the practical implementation. 
A solution for increasing route robustness for the networks is the utilization of 
redundant paths, as stated in [12]. The effectiveness of this protection is restricted 
because the end point of a route is not always capable of discovering the attack by the 
malicious node.  
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The basic security role for ad hoc networks is to set up a secure 
communications channel between the participating nodes. This can be done by 
generating a shared secret key for the encryption and authentication of the data packet 
to be sent between the nodes. An efficient protocol for key exchange has been 
presented in [8]. In [15], the authors suggest a password-based authentication protocol 
that is derived from the Encrypted Key Exchange protocol, with emphasis on the 
robustness of the protocol against the failure of some nodes. In this case, the secure 
connections between the participants are created from a manually exchanged password. 
Hence, no support infrastructure is needed. It should be noted that a shared secret key 
is unable to prevent the group members from eavesdropping on each other. The idea is 
that the member nodes should trust each other with respect to the purpose of the group. 
A small number of security schemes for internal attacks have been proposed for 
ad hoc networks. An architecture for cooperative and distributed intrusion detection for 
wireless ad hoc networks is presented in [18]. The primary assumption is that the user 
and program activities are observable. The process of building an anomaly detection 
model is discussed. The major drawback of anomaly detection is that it may not be 
able to describe what the attack is and may have high false positive rate. Other 
proposals for intrusion detection which introduce techniques that improve throughput 
by identifying misbehaving nodes in an ad hoc network [17] and proposed the 
intrusion detection agent to prevent some internal attacks on network [11]. 
Most of the MANET routing protocols can deal with the dynamically changing 
nature of the ad hoc networks. However, none of these protocols appear to be able to 
handle security appropriately. The majority of the routing protocols do not take into 
account the necessary security needs at the present time [9]. This leads to the 
presumption that security mechanisms will be retrofitted after the proposed protocol 
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has been tested well enough. Consequently, it might lead to unforeseeable and 
untraceable vulnerabilities in the system if the security schemes are not designed 
concurrently with the basic routing protocol. However, all the MANET routing 
protocol proposals do not disregard the security issues entirely. Some of the routing 
protocols suggest and believe that IPSec [4] is able to provide excellent confidentiality, 
authentication and protection mechanism so that the security issues need not be 
handled by the routing protocol itself. Retrofitting IPSec to the existing routing 
protocol, however, would produce additional overheads to the system.  
Furthermore, IPSec does not secure the routing protocol; it only provides 
security and authentication between two end nodes with existing routes to each other. 
Some of the security schemes proposed for on-demand routing protocols rely on 
symmetric cryptography [22,23] which assume the existence of the security association 
and shared secret keys between source and destination node. Such assumptions ignore 
the key distribution mechanisms which could increase the overheads in the network 
and decrease the performance of the protocol. 
 
3.2  Related Work 
3.2.1 Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing in Mobile Wireless Ad 
Hoc Networks 
Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD) [20] is 
robust against multiple uncoordinated attackers creating incorrect routing state in any 
other node, even against active attackers or compromised nodes in the network. The 
design of SEAD is based in part on the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector ad hoc 
network routing protocol (DSDV) [7]. In order to support the use of SEAD with nodes 
of limited CPU processing capability, and to guard against Denial-of-Service attacks in 
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which an attacker attempts to cause other nodes to consume excess network bandwidth 
or processing time, SEAD uses efficient one-way hash functions. 
A one-way hash chain is built on a one-way hash function. To create a one-way 
hash chain, a node chooses a random x  {0,1} and computes the list of values h0, h1, 
h2, h3, …, hn where h0 = x, and hi = H(hi-1) for 0 < i ≤ n, for some n. The node at 
initialization generates the elements of its hash chain as shown above, from left to right 
and then over time uses certain elements of the chain to secure its routing updates; in 
using these values, the node progresses from right to left within the generated chain. 
Each node in SEAD uses a specific single next element from its hash chain in 
each routing update that it sends about itself (metric 0). Based on this initial element, 
the one-way hash chain conceptually provides authentication for the lower bound of 
the metric in other routing updates for this destination; the authentication provides only 
a lower bound on the metric: an attacker can increase the metric, claim the same metric, 
but cannot decrease the metric. 
The method used by SEAD for authenticating an entry in a routing update uses 
the sequence number in that entry to determine a contiguous group of m elements from 
that destination node’s hash chain, one element of which must be used to authenticate 
that routing update. The particular element from this group of elements that must be 






3.2.2  Secure Routing for Mobile Ad hoc Networks 
The provision of comprehensive secure communication for mobile ad hoc 
networks mandates that both route discovery and data forwarding be safeguarded. The 
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [22] counters malicious behavior that targets the 
discovery of topological information. Protection of data transmission is addressed 
through the related Secure Message Transmission Protocol (SMT), which provides a 
flexible, end-to-end secure data forwarding scheme that naturally complement SRP.  
SRP provides correct routing information, i.e., factual, up-to-date, and 
authentic connectivity information regarding a pair of nodes that wish to communicate 
in a secure manner. The sole requirement is that any two such end nodes have a 
security association. Accordingly, SRP does not require any of the intermediate nodes 
to perform cryptographic operations or have a prior association with the end nodes. As 
a result, its end-to-end operation allows for cryptographic mechanisms, such as 
message authentication codes. 
SRP discovers one or more routes whose correctness can be verified from the 
route geometry itself. Route requests propagate verifiably to the sought, trusted 
destination. Route replies are returned strictly over the reversed route, as accumulated 
in the route request packet. In order to guarantee this crucially important functionality, 
the interaction of the protocol with the IP-related functionality is explicitly defined. 
It has been shown that, over a range of scenarios, SRP is successful in 
providing correct routing information in a timely manner. It can do so even in the 
presence of adversaries that disrupt the route discovery. Moreover, the observation 
shows that the processing overhead due to cryptographic operations remains low, 
allowing the protocol to remain competitive to reactive protocols, which do not 
incorporate security features at all.  
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3.2.3 Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc 
Networks 
Ariadne [23] is a secure on demand routing protocol that relies on symmetric 
cryptography. Ariadne can authenticate routing messages using one of three schemes: 
shared secrets between each pair of nodes, shared secrets between communicating 
nodes combined with broadcast authentication, or digital signatures. The use of 
Ariadne with TESLA (Time Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) [6], an 
efficient broadcast authentication scheme that requires loose time synchronization, is 
discussed primarily in this section. Using pairwise shared keys avoids the need for 
synchronization, but at the cost of higher key setup overhead. 
Basic Ariadne Route Discovery: The design of the Ariadne protocol is 
presented in two stages: a mechanism that enables the target to verify the authenticity 
of the ROUTE REQUEST is presented first, and follow by an efficient per-hop hashing 
technique to verify that no node is missing from the node list in the REQUEST. The 
initiator S performs a Route Discovery for target D is assumed in the following 
discussion, and that they share the secret keys KSD and KDS, respectively, for message 
authentication in each direction. 
Target authenticates ROUTE REQUESTs. To convince the target of the 
legitimacy of each field in a ROUTE REQUEST, the initiator simply includes a MAC 
computed with key KSD over unique data, for example a timestamp. The target can 
easily verify the authenticity and freshness of the route request using the shared key 
KSD. 
In a Route Discovery, the initiator wants to authenticate each individual node 
in the node list of the ROUTE REPLY. A secondary requirement is that the target can 
authenticate each node in the node list of the ROUTE REQUEST, so that it will return a 
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ROUTE REPLY only along paths that contain legitimate nodes. Each hop authenticates 
new information in the REQUEST. The target buffers the REPLY until intermediate 
nodes can release the corresponding TESLA keys. The TESLA security condition is 
verified at the target, and the target includes a MAC in the REPLY to certify that the 
security condition was met. 
Per-hop hashing. Authentication of data in routing messages is not sufficient, 
as an attacker could remove a node from the node list in a REQUEST. One-way hash 
functions are used to verify that no hop was omitted, and this approach is called per-
hop hashing. To change or remove a previous hop, an attacker must either hear a 
REQUEST without that node listed, or must be able to invert the one-way hash function.  
Basic Ariadne Route Maintenance: Route Maintenance in Ariadne is based on 
DSR. A node forwarding a packet to the next hop along the source route returns a 
ROUTE ERROR to the original sender of the packet if it is unable to deliver the packet to 
the next hop after a limited number of retransmission attempts. To prevent 
unauthorized nodes from sending ERRORs, an ERROR is required to be authenticated by 
the sender. Each node on the return path to the source forwards the ERROR. If the 
authentication is delayed, for example when TESLA is used, each node that will be 
able to authenticate the ERROR buffers it until it can be authenticated. 
Avoiding Routing Misbehavior: The protocol described so far is vulnerable to 
an attacker that happens to be along the discovered route. In particular, Ariadne has not 
presented a means of determining whether intermediate nodes are in fact forwarding 
packets that they have been requested to forward. Routes based on their prior 
performance in packet delivery are chosen. The scheme relies on feedback about which 
packets were successfully delivered. The feedback can be received either through an 
extra end-to-end network layer message, or by exploiting properties of transport layers, 
29 
such as TCP with SACK [56]; this feedback approach is somewhat similar that used in 
IPv6 for Neighbor Unreachability Detection [21]. 
A node with multiple routes to a single destination can assign a fraction of 
packets that it originates to be sent along each route. When a substantially smaller 
fraction of packets sent along any particular route are successfully delivered, the node 
can begin sending a smaller fraction of its overall packets to that destination along that 
route. 
 
3.2.4  Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks  
The Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) protocol [2] uses 
public key cryptography to guarantee message authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation. The protocol is designed for the managed-open environment, where nodes 
can obtain a public key certificate from a common certification authority that is trusted 
by all other nodes in the environment. Typical examples of such an environment are 
classroom or conference scenarios. The operation of the protocol can be divided into 
route discovery and route maintenance phases. 
The route discovery process is initiated by the source node by flooding a 
digitally signed Route Discovery packet (RDP) to its neighbors. When a neighbor A 
receives the RDP message, it sets up a reverse path back to the source node and 
verifies the signature of the source by extracting S’s public key from its certificate. The 
node then signs the contents of the message, appends its own certificate, and 
broadcasts the message to its neighbors. When A’s neighbor B receives the message, it 
validates A’s signature, and then replaces it with its own signature (the signature of the 
source node is retained). The packet continues to be rebroadcast in this manner across 
the network until it reaches the destination. 
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When the first RDP reaches the destination, the destination node verifies the 
signature of the source node and then sends a digitally signed Route Reply packet 
(REP) back to the source. The REP travels along the same path as the RDP, and the 
same signing procedure is performed by intermediate nodes. Note that because the 
destination must sign the REP message, only the destination is allowed to respond to 
the RDP. Also, because RDP messages are signed at each hop and do not contain a hop 
count or a source route, malicious nodes have no opportunity to intentionally redirect 
traffic. 
Route maintenance is performed through digitally signed Error messages that 
are initiated by the node directly upstream of a link failure. 
 
3.2.5  Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing 
The Ad hoc On-Demand Distance-Vector (AODV) [3] routing protocol is a 
reactive routing protocol for mobile nodes in ad hoc networks. The Secure AODV 
(SAODV) [14] routing protocol is an extension of the AODV routing protocol that 
provides security features for the route discovery mechanism.  
The fundamental idea of this scheme is that the original sender of the routing 
message attaches a signature to the AODV packet using their private key. The 
destination node or intermediate node can generate the route replies. However, an 
intermediate node that wants to reply a request needs not only the correct route, but   
also the signature corresponding to that route to add it in the route reply and the 
lifetime that came in the same message of the signature. The hop count of all the 
control messages is verified using a hash chain.  
The SAODV scheme assumes that each node is able to obtain the public keys 
of others network nodes and public key of the certification authority if the nodes 
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connect periodically to a fixed network. This assumption is unreasonable because it 
ignores the public key distribution which could increase the traffic load in the networks. 
Applying hash chains for authenticating the hop counter could lead to a problem 
because a malicious node might not increment the hop counter and make use of the 




















The Secure Routing Protocol (SEROP) for Mobile Ad 
hoc Networks 
 
The Secure Routing Protocol, SEROP works as an extension to an on-demand 
routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks. For the simulation purposes, we base our 
protocol, SEROP, on the basic operation of the Caching and Multi-Path (CHAMP) [1] 
routing protocol.  
 
4.1 Operation of CHAMP 
CHAMP is a reactive routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks that utilizes 
data caching and shortest multiple path routing to support mobility and achieve 
energy-efficiency. In this section, we briefly describe the basic operation of CHAMP.  
CHAMP uses three kinds of control messages, namely route request (RREQ), 
route reply (RREP) and route error (RERR). Every node in the network keeps two data 
structures, namely route cache and route request cache. Route cache stores next hop 
information and other details required for data packet forwarding. Meanwhile, the 
information of recently received and processed route requests is stored in the route 
request cache. Besides that, each node also keeps a FIFO send buffer for storing 
packets waiting for routes and a data cache for storing recently forwarded data packets. 
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A data packet is recognized by the source identifier and a sequence number. 
CHAMP picks the least used route for the transmission of data packets in order to 
balance the load. In general, when a node has data to forward, if there is more than one 
route to the destination in its route cache, it chooses the route with the least use count 
and forwards the data packet. Then, it keeps a copy of the data packet in its data cache. 
However, if there is no route to the destination, it saves the data in its send buffer and 
carries out a route discovery instantly. 
Route discovery is started by a source node that has a data packet to send but 
has no available route to the intended destination by broadcasting a RREQ packet. In 
order to ensure that the protocol is robust against topology changes, a node is 
encouraged to discover multiple routes to a particular destination. However, to prevent 
network congestion, sending of the request is separated by an increasing interval using 
binary exponential back off. 
When a node receives an RREQ and it has no active route to the destination, it 
records the previous hop and forward count of the packet. The previous hop nodes that 
send requests with the lowest forward count are included in the RREP receivers set of 
the node. This receiver set is used in the creation of a route reply packet. However, if 
the node has an active route to the destination, it can reply to the request provided that 
its distance to the destination is less than the last hop count encoded in the request.  
When the destination node receives a RREQ from its neighbour, it immediately 
sends back a RREP if the hop count is less than the minimum forward count. RREP 
contains a set of nodes that can receive it which taken from the RREP receivers set and 
the set nodes that forward the same RREQ. 
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Route maintenance occurs only when all active routes fail. A local route repair 
is performed by carrying out a limited route search. If the repair fails, a route deletion 
is performed by notifying the upstream nodes to remove that particular route and 
reroute the affected data. Since the data packets are cached, an upstream node with an 
alternate route is able to retransmit the same data again to the destination. This leads to 
a small routing overhead and savings in energy consumption. 
Extensive simulations [1] have been performed to gauge the performance of 
CHAMP and compare it with AODV and DSR. Simulation results show that by using 
a five-packet data cache and two routes per destination configuration, CHAMP is able 
to achieve good improvement in packet delivery, outperforming AODV and DSR by 
up to 30% in very congested scenarios and the delay of CHAMP is half that of AODV 
and DSR. In terms of routing overhead, CHAMP generates a relatively lower overhead 
at higher mobility rates. Based on these finding, we can assume that implementing 
SEROP over CHAMP will generally give better performance than implementing it 










4.2 The Proposed Protocol – SEROP 
Security is a crucial issue in any network. The dynamic feature of ad hoc 
networks makes it very difficult to guarantee secure communication in these networks. 
Effective performance of ad hoc networks relies on the maintenance of proper network 
routing information. Nevertheless, securing routing protocols without securing 
network transmissions is not adequate. Therefore, we focus on protecting the data 
transmission and making the routing protocol secure. In this section, we present the 
Secure Routing Protocol (SEROP) [10] for mobile ad hoc networks that achieves data 
confidentiality and secures the routing protocols.  
 
4.2.1 Assumptions 
The formation of the network is accomplished after the approval of the Master 
node M that created the network. We assume that the network comprises of a group of 
mutually trusting nodes. All the links between the nodes are bi-directional. In addition, 
all nodes are capable of carrying out the encryption algorithms with limited 
computational power. The adversary lacks the computational power to break the 
protocol that we have designed through brute force methods. All nodes in the network 
trust any data message signed using the corresponding private key. Finally, each node 











4.2.2 Key Distribution 
SEROP is a hybrid cryptosystem. Public-key algorithm is used to establish 
secure routing between nodes, and symmetric key algorithm provides confidentiality of 
the data transmitted over the network. Table 4.1 summarizes our notations. The 
network creator is the only entity that has the master public and private key pairs. 
Before entering a network, each node needs to send its own public key to the master 
node in order to get the certificate. Besides that, each node is also given the master 
public key which occurs offline before joining the network. In addition, security 
mechanisms for wired networks may help in the process of certification.  
 
 
KPVM Private key of Master node 
KPUM Public key of Master node 
KPVA Private key of node A 
KPUA Public key of node A 
CA Certificate of node A 
IDA Identity of node A 
TS Timestamp 
VP Validity Period 
# Sequence number of route request 
KPVA <D> Digital Signature of data D with KPVA 
KPUA <D> Encryption of data D with KPUA 
g^xA Diffie-Hellman public value of node A 
KA,B Diffie-Hellman shared secret key for node A and  node B 
ACA Attribute Certificate of node A 
CHAA Random Challenge String from node A 
 
Table 4.1 Table of Notation 
 
37 
The certificates are exchanged whenever two nodes interact for the first time. 
The contents of the certificate are the identity of node S, the public key of node S, and 
the validity period of the certificate, i.e. 
 
CS = KPVM <IDS + KPUS + VP>                                                                     (1) 
 
4.2.3 Route Discovery Request 
A route discovery request is initiated by a source node whenever it has data to 
send but has no available route. For this purpose, Route Requests (RREQ) are 
broadcasted by the source and propagated through the network. Since the effectiveness 
of the network depends on maintaining the correct routing information, a source node 
must sign the RREQ for integrity before broadcasting it along with its own certificate 
to its neighbour node. The elements that need to be signed are the identities of source 
and destination nodes, the sequence number of route request and the Diffie-Hellman 
public value (i.e. g^xS) of the source node. 
Source node S begins the route discovery process to destination node D by 
broadcasting to its neighbours (e.g. node A) the signed RREQ and its own certificate 
(Figure 4.1). Source node S can use different g^xS every time it originates a request so 
that the Diffie-Hellman shared secret key (e.g. KS,D=g^xSxD) is different for different 
session. On the other hand, for the sake of computational efficiency, source node S 
may use identical g^xS for multiple sessions and let the Diffie-Hellman shared secret 
key be given by KS,D = h(g^xSxD|#) because g^xS and g^xD need not be computed 
frequently. 
 
S  A: {RREQ, KPVS<IDS ,IDD ,#,g^xS>, CS}                                                 (2) 
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 Equation (3) Equation (2) 
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Figure 4.1 Route Discovery Request  
 
The validity of RREQ is verified by using node S’s public key (KPUS) which 
can be obtained from the certificate of node S. If RREQ is valid, as shown in 
Flowchart 4.1, node A will update its routing table before forwarding the whole route 
discovery request packet to its neighbour nodes (e.g. node B), as illustrated in Figure 
4.1. Otherwise, the route request packet will be discarded. 
 
A  B: {RREQ, KPVS<IDS ,IDD ,#,g^xS>, CS}                                                (3) 
 
Node B will repeat the same step as described above after it has received the 
request from node A. The route discovery request will be rebroadcast repeatedly until 
it reaches destination node D.  The certificate of node S may not be useful for node A 
because node A is the immediate neighbour of node S. However, the certificate will 
become useful after node A rebroadcasts the request to its neighbour node B because 
node B may not be the immediate neighbour of node S. Thus, node B may not possess 
the public key of node S for this case. Every node along the path to D needs the 
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 Flowchart 4.1 Route Discovery Request 
 
4.2.4 Route Reply 
Destination node D validates the received route discovery request by 
confirming the validity of RREQ, as shown in Flowchart 4.2. A Diffie-Hellman shared 
secret key between the node S and node D is derived by node D (i.e. KS,D=g^xSxD) 
through the authentication procedure. This shared secret key is used to encrypt data 
packet in the subsequent transmission. The encryption algorithm is based on 
symmetric key encryption and this can reduce the computational cost of encryption as 
compared to public key encryption. 
To allow intermediate node reply, which will be discussed in the following 
section, node D provides its neighbour an Attribute Certificate (ACD) whenever it 
replies to the request. In addition, a node may also provide its immediate neighbours 
an attribute certificate periodically. The contents of the attribute certificate are the 
identities of the nodes that are eligible to send a reply on behalf of the attribute 
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For destination node 
 Update Route Table



















Flowchart 4.2 Route Reply
certificate’s originator, the validity period of the attribute certificate, and the Diffie-
Hellman public value of the originator, i.e. 
 
 ACD = KPVD<IDA,B,C,…+ VP + g^xD>                                                            (4) 
 
Strong authentication is performed at all adjacent pairs that transmit route 
replies, as depicted in Figure 4.2. Node D sends a Partial Reply (PREP) to its 
neighbour (e.g. node C) before sending the Route Reply (RREP). The PREP has a field 
that contains a Random Challenge String (CHAD) for the neighbour. The challenges 
are small in size to keep the bandwidth overhead low. 
 
D  C: {PREP}                                          (5) 
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 Equation (7) 
Equation (6) 
Equation (5) 
D C  
 
 
Figure 4.2 Route Reply  
 
Node C checks the contents of PREP and will discard it if it does not 
correspond to the current pending route discovery request. Otherwise, node C will send 
node D the encrypted CHAD and a new challenge string. 
 
C  D: {KPVC<CHAD,CHAC>}                                                                      (6) 
 
If authentication fails during the challenge-response process, the packet is 
dropped by node D. Besides sending the random challenge string, node D sends node 
C the entire packet of route reply which consists of the signed RREP, and the attribute 
certificate.  
 
D  C: {KPVD<CHAC>, RREP, KPVD<IDD ,IDS ,#,g^xD>, ACD , CD}          (7) 
 
Node C does the necessary verification. After all these authentications, node C 
will keep a copy of node D’s attribute certificate and update its routing table before 
repeating the same procedure with its neighbour nodes. In addition, node C needs to 
send its own attribute certificate to its neighbour as well when relaying the entire route 
reply packet. Every intermediate node along the path back to the source node S is 
required to keep a copy of the relevant attribute certificates as an evidence of having an 
active route to the corresponding destination node.  
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The procedure mentioned above continues until the route reply control message 
reach as the source node S. Node S updates its routing table after doing the necessary 
verification and will derive the Diffie-Hellman shared secret key based on the received 
g^xD. Since the replies are authenticated, these routes are valid and can be used for 
sending data packets. Whenever node S originates a data packet to the intended 
destination, the data packet must be encrypted with the corresponding secret key for 
confidentiality. 
 
4.2.5 Intermediate Node Reply 
In order to achieve the required robustness and to improve the effectiveness of 
the route discovery process, an intermediate node I can generate an Intermediate Node 
Reply (INREP) provided that it has an active route to the destination and also has the 
valid attribute certificate chain to the destination. This is the only case where the route 
discovery request does not actually reach the destination. It is required to present the 
attribute certificate chain in order to prevent a node from generating a false INREP. 
Furthermore, an Intermediate node cannot reply to the route discovery request 
although it has the active route to destination if one of the attribute certificates has 
expired. 
The intermediate node reply procedure is likely to be the same as the 
destination node route reply procedure. The Intermediate node I receives a route 
request from its neighbours (e.g. node B), as shown in Figure 4.3, and it has the active 
route to the sought destination. Therefore, node I will send PREP to node B to reply to 
the request. Node B examines the contents of PREP. If it does not correspond to the 
present awaiting route discovery request, the packet will be dropped. Otherwise, node 
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Figure 4.3 Intermediate Node Reply 
 
After the necessary authentication from challenge-response identification, node 
I will send node B the whole intermediate node reply packet which comprises of the 
signed INREP, and the relevant attribute certificate chain, as illustrated in flowchart 
4.3. 
 
I  B: {KPVI<CHAB>, INREP, KPVI<IDI ,IDS ,#>, (ACI,…,ACD ), CD}         (8) 
 
Signing the INREP is to guarantee the non-repudiation of the sender. The 
packet is discarded if the authentication fails. After the authentication, node B updates 
its routing table and repeats the same authentication procedures with its neighbours 
who sent the identical RREQ to node B. The procedures described above will continue 
until the control messages arrive at source node S. In this case, the Diffie-Hellman 
shared secret key between the node S and node D can be derived by obtaining g^xD 
from node D’s attribute certificate. In order to maintain the secrecy of the data packet, 
it must be encrypted with the secret key whenever it is transmitted to the intended 
destination.  
In SEROP, we cannot verify whether node I still has an active route (link may 
be broken) to the destination although it possesses the valid attribute certificate chain. 
However, node I is unable to deny having sent the control messages in the past due to 
the non-repudiation property applied to the signed INREP. Furthermore, by setting 
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short validity period for attribute certificate, it can minimize the harm to the network 
caused by false INREP replies from node I. 
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Flowchart 4.3 Intermediate Node Reply 
 
4.2.6 Route Maintenance & Deletion 
Route Maintenance takes place when a node (e.g. node E) in the active path 
loses its entire route to the destination. Nevertheless, node E attempts a local route 
repair by sending a RREQ with limited propagation range. If this attempt fails, node E 
will instantly carry out Route Deletion and send its upstream node (e.g. node U) the 
Route Error message (RERR), as shown in Figure 4.4. All RERRs along with the 
timestamp must be signed by the sender. 
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Figure 4.4 Route Maintenance & Deletion 
 
A timestamp ensures that the RERR is fresh. After checking the cache, the 
corresponding route entry will be deleted by node U only if U’s route to the deleted 
destination is via E. Otherwise, RERR will be dropped. Node U then sends the RERR 
and repeats the same procedure to its upstream node, as illustrated in Flowchart 4.4. 
It is extremely difficult to identify RERRs that are from a link which is not 
broken. However, the node that generates RERR cannot deny having sent it because 
the RERR is signed. In addition, there are no advantages at all if a node maliciously 
generates a RERR to its upstream node since its upstream node may have alternative 
routes to the destination  
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Flowchart 4.4 Route Maintenance & Deletion
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4.2.7 Key Revocation 
The Master node M can revoke the certificate of a node when the node is no 
longer having the right to enter the network. For the case when a certificate needs to be 
revoked, the master node is required to sign the Revoke Certificate (RevokeCert) 
control message and append it to the RevokeCert before broadcasting it to the ad hoc 
network. 
 
M  network: {RevokeCert, KPVM<RevokeCert>}                                       (10) 
 
Any node that receives RevokeCert will rebroadcast it to its neighbours and 
update its routing table to avoid transmitting data through that particular node. The 
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Figure 4.5 Overall Picture of the Protocol 
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4.3  Reasoning Logic 
In this section, we demonstrate the reasoning process to SEROP. The analysis 
is based on the methodology in [29,28]. Since the protocol is the basis of security in 
the ad-hoc networks, it is therefore crucial to make sure that the protocol is functioning 
correctly. Based on certain initial beliefs and possessions, the participating principals 
may expand their belief sets, as a result of receiving new beliefs. Inference rules make 
the derivation of new beliefs from current beliefs and from incoming messages 
possible. The general assumption is that principals do not disclose their secrets. 
  In particular, we follow the notations, methods and selected logical postulates 
underlying our reasoning process in [28,22]. The complete set of the notations is 
included in table 4.2, as in [28,22]. The line that separates two statements indicates that 
the upper statement implies the lower one. The protocol is to be in deep thought as the 
exchange of two control messages, a Route Discovery Request and a Route Reply. The 
protocol with the parts which contain the control messages that do not contribute to the 
participants’ beliefs is omitted, as shown in the figure 4.6. Node S and node D are the 
source node and destination node respectively.  Node A is the immediate neighbour of 












Equation (3) {RREQ, KPVS<IDS ,IDD ,#,g^xS>, CS}  
Equation (5) {PREP} 
Equation (6) {KPVS<CHAA,CHAS>}  
Equation (7) {KPVA<CHAS>, RREP, KPVD<IDD ,IDS ,#,g^xD>, ACD , CD}  
 
 
 Figure 4.6 The protocol is observed as an exchange of two control messages 
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XP   P is told formula X 
 P is told formula X which he did not convey previously in 
the current run 
 P possesses, or is capable of processing, formula X 
 P once conveyed formula X 
 P believes, or is entitled to believe, that formula X is fresh 
 P believes, or is entitled to believe, that formula X is 
recognizable 
P believes, or is entitled to believe, that KPUQ is a suitable 
public key for Q 
 P believes, or is entitled to believe, that KP,Q is a suitable 
secret for P and Q 
 P believes that Q has jurisdiction over statement C 
 









QPP QPK  ,|
CQP  ||
For Route Discovery Request, the initial assumptions are: 
(i) 
MS KPUKPU
SS MSSSKPVKPUS   |,|),/(  
The source node S possesses its own public/private key pair and believes that 
the KPUS is a suitable public key for itself. It also believes that KPUM is the suitable 
public key for the Master node M. 
  (ii) 
MD KPUKPU
DD MDSDKPVKPUD   |,|),/(  
  (iii) 
MA KPUKPU
AA MASAKPVKPUA   |,|),/(  
Similarly, destination node D and node A hold their own public/private key 
pairs and believe that the KPUD and KPUA is a suitable public key for itself 
respectively. Both nodes also trust that KPUM is the right public key for Master node 
M. Moreover, node S believes that PREP and RREP are recognizable, and node D 
believes that RREQ is recognizable. 
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(iv) )(|),,(| RREQDRREPPREPS    



























This means that node D receives a packet with the not-originate-here property, 



















Likewise to (vi), we infer that node D holds the remainder of the control 
messages. Since node D holds the certificate of node S, we also deduce that node D 
knows the public key of node S. As a result, node D believes that KPUS is the suitable 

















)(|,| ,KPUD ,,#,, S        
This means that node D believes that node S once conveyed RREQ and the 
signature of RREQ. This implies the belief that the control message is originated from 
node S. Until this stage, the stated goal is fulfilled, i.e. the Route Discovery Request is 





For Route Reply, the initial assumptions are: 
(ix) ACHAA  , )(#| ACHAA  , SCHAS  , )(#| SCHAS   
Node A is possessed of CHAA and source node S possesses CHAS and believes 
that CHAA and CHAS are fresh respectively. 
(x) DSKD , , )(#| , DSKD  , SDD DSK  ,|  
Node D possesses the new generated Diffie-Hellman shared secret key KS,D 
and believes the key is fresh. Node D believes that KS,D is a suitable secret key for 


















Since the certificates are exchanged wherever two nodes interact for the first 
time, thus, node S and node A believe that KPUA and KPUS are the suitable public 
keys for node A and node S respectively. 
(xii) )(| ACHAA  , )(| SCHAS  , )(| , DSKS   
Node A believes that CHAA is recognizable, and node S believes that CHAS 
and KS,D are recognizable. 













 PREPS  
i.e. node S received a Partial Reply (PREP) packet and node S is capable to 
process it. Besides that, node S also possesses CHAA. 
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 KPUAA   
Similarly to (xiii), we infer that node A possesses the rest of the field of the 
control messages. Since node A possesses the public key of node S, thus node A is 
considered to have been told the CHAA.  














       
Node A believes that the control message is originated from node S. This 
signifies the belief that the intended recipient for CHAA is in fact node S, and not other 
nodes. Identity of node S is verified. 
  
In the same manner, for Equation (7), we get:  
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Node S may then generates the Diffie-Hellman shared secret key, KS,D from the 









    
Node S believes that node D has jurisdiction over DS DSK  , . Node D 
believes that KS,D is a suitable secret key shared between node S and node D, 
meanwhile node S believes that KS,D is a suitable secret key share between node S and 
node D. 
After all these complex inferences, source node S believes that the entire route 
reply is originated from destination node D. The reasoning process based on the 
postulates above leads us to the conclusion that the security goals for the protocol are 
achieved. In a very similar way, this conclusion can be reached for the case where the 
Intermediate Node generates the route reply. 
 
4.4 Appraisal of SEROP 
In this section, we evaluate the ability of SEROP in meeting fundamental 
security needs such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation.  
Generation of false control messages such as route request and route reply by 
non-legitimate nodes: This is infeasible because a non-legitimate node does not 
possess valid certificates from the master node. Since all the nodes are required to 
exchange their certificate when they interact for the first time, any control messages 
from a non-legitimate node will be discarded by legitimate nodes if the initial 
authentication failed. 
A maliciously legitimate node impersonating another node and sending route 
requests to cause inconsistencies in route table: The immediate neighbour that 
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receives the request can prevent this kind of attack by checking the contents of route 
requests since senders are required to sign the route request before broadcasting it to its 
neighbours.  
Refusal to forward route requests by a malicious node upon receiving it from 
its neighbours: This kind of attack is hard to counter; however, the regulated flooding 
of route requests provides the required robustness. Furthermore, to ensure that the 
protocol is robust over various topologies, discovery of multiple routes to a particular 
destination is encouraged. 
Tampering of control messages by malicious nodes: This action may produce 
incorrect route information to the network. The routing operations will be affected if 
the integrity of data is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, this is impossible to happen in the 
protocol because the integrity of each control message is ensured by the digital 
signature for that particular control message. 
Creation of false Intermediate Node Reply and Route Error intentionally by 
malevolent node: This type of attack is extremely difficult to prevent in the network. 
However, setting short expiration time for attribute certificate can mitigate the 
impairment caused by the false INREP replies.  
Release of message contents: This is a kind of passive attack which is very 
difficult to detect because the opponents do not invoke any alteration of the data. 
Nevertheless, SEROP enables legitimate nodes to prevent the opponent from learning 
the contents of the data packets. It is because at any time when a source node 
originates a data packet to the sought destination, the data packet must be encrypted 






Simulations and Results 
 
This section presents the performance evaluation of the Secure Routing 
Protocol (SEROP) [10], a secure routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks that 
helps in achieving data confidentiality as well as securing the routing protocol.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Our goal is to evaluate and determine the impact on various performance 
metrics of the SEROP protocol in both benign and malicious networks. SEROP is an 
extension built over a base routing protocol, in this case, CHAMP, by modifying the 
basic operation code of CHAMP. For a benign network, we compare the performance 
of SEROP with that of the basic CHAMP protocol (which does not take security into 
consideration). Besides that, we conducted two different attack scenarios for malicious 
network to determine its robustness in the presence of malicious nodes. The simulation 





5.2 Performance Evaluation 
 The objective of this performance study is to evaluate and determine the impact 
on various performance metrics and operation of the SEROP protocol in both benign 
and malicious networks through simulation. Since we based our protocol on the basic 
operation of CHAMP [1], the existing code of CHAMP is modified to make it secure. 
For benign networks, we compare the performance of SEROP with that of basic 
CHAMP (which does not specify any special security measures). Besides that, we also 
performed simulations to compare the performance of SEROP and CHAMP for 
different source loads.  
For malicious networks, we present a security analysis of SEROP by 
determining its robustness in the presence of different attack scenarios and varying 
number of malicious nodes. The first attack scenario is where the malicious nodes 
purposely tamper with the RREQ messages and rebroadcast them to their neighbours. 
This action may produce incorrect route information to the network. The second attack 
scenario is that of a malicious node impersonating another node by rebroadcasting the 
modified RREP or INREP to cause inconsistencies in the route table. 
We used the following metrics to evaluate the performance of our protocol.  
(1) Packet Delivery Ratio: The total number of packets received divided by the 
total number of packets originated.  
(2) End-to-end Delay: The delay of all packets successfully delivered.  
(3) Normalized Routing Overhead: The total number of the routing messages 
originated and forwarded divided by the total number of the data packets 
received. For malicious network, we use byte overhead instead of 
normalized routing overhead.  
(4) Byte Overhead: The amount of the overhead bytes transmitted. 
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5.3 Simulation Setup 
The simulation is implemented on the ns-2 simulator with mobility extensions. 
The network consists of 50 nodes in a rectangular area of 1500 m x 300 m. The two-
ray ground model is used as the radio propagation model. For Medium Access Control 
protocol, the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function is used. Traffic sources 
used are Constant Bit Rate (CBR) where the rate of the packet generation is four data 
packets per second. Each data packet is 512 bytes long.  
For traffic file, source and destination pairs are randomly generated and spread 
over the entire network. The scenario file, which decides the mobility of the nodes, is 
generated using the scene generator of the simulator. The mobility model chosen is the 
Random Waypoint Model. Each node starts moving from a random start point to a 
random destination with a speed uniformly chosen between zero and a maximum 
speed. Once the node reaches the destination, it waits for a pause time before moving 
towards another randomly selected destination. The mobility of the nodes is dependant 
on the different pause times. Each simulation is carried out for 120 seconds. Table 5.1 
summarizes the parameters used in our simulation. 
To evaluate the performance of the SEROP protocol as an extension to a 
reactive routing protocol, we have modified CHAMP in two aspects. The first is 
increasing the packet size due to the additional overhead of executing the security 
procedures such as authentication of the control messages. The other is adding another 
control message to CHAMP i.e. INREP, which enables an intermediate node to reply 




                                   Table 5.1 Simulation Parameters 
Tool 
Number of Nodes 
Movement Area 
Simulation Time 
Nominal Radio Range 
Raw Bit Rate 
Data Packet Size 













50-packet drop-tail priority 
CBR 
4 packets/second 
IEEE 802.11 DCF 
20 m/s 
60 random runs for benign network 




5.4 Simulation Results for Benign Network 
 Figures in this section show the simulation results which compare the 
performance of SEROP with CHAMP by using the identical traffic source and 
scenario file. Figure 5.1 shows the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) as a function of pause 
time. Generally, the PDR for all load settings increases with decreasing mobility. At 
zero pause time for 10 sources, CHAMP delivers 96.3% of packets successfully, and 
adding security features to CHAMP, SEROP reduces PDR by merely 2%. Specifically, 
SEROP does not reduce PDR of CHAMP by more than 2.7% for all pause time for 10 
sources. At 40 sources, the PDR of SEROP and CHAMP are becoming identical as 
mobility decreases. This suggests that SEROP performs very well in terms of PDR at 
low mobility and high traffic load environments. 
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 Figure 5.1a Packet Delivery Ratio vs Pause Time
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Figure 5.1b Packet Delivery Ratio vs Pause Time 
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Figure 5.2 illustrates the Packet Delivery Ratio as a function of traffic load. The 
result on packet delivery is inversely proportional the increase in number of data 
sources, as depicted in the figure. Basically, the PDR drops as the traffic load increases 
for all pause time. However, SEROP copes very well with the increase of data sources, 
as it reduces the PDR by not more than 4% for all number of data sources at all pause 
time. The results imply that incorporating SEROP into CHAMP does not drastically 
degrade the performance of the routing protocol in terms of packet delivery. 
 





























































 Figure 5.2b Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Sources 
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 Figure 5.2c Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Sources 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates the average end-to-end delay experienced by the packets. 
In general, the end-to-end delay for all traffic load increases with decreasing mobility. 
High mobility rate influences the delay for all protocols. The performance of SEROP 
in terms of delay is not exception. It produces a low delay at any pause time if 
compared to CHAMP although required to execute authentication procedures in order 
to secure the routing protocol. The lowest delay for all pause time is observed when 



















































































Figure 5.4 shows the average end-to-end delay as a function of different data 
sources. The delays of the protocols are also influenced by traffic load. For pause times 
of 0, 12, 40, 60 and 80 seconds, SEROP exhibits a marginal increase of delay over 
CHAMP. Surprisingly, SEROP outperforms CHAMP at higher pause time, i.e. 120 
seconds. This improvement is due to the introduction of intermediate node reply in the 
protocol. Each node that satisfies the conditions of INREP may help to reduce the 
delay experienced by the packet by responding to the route query. 
 


























































































































Figure 5.4d End-to-end Delay vs Number of Sources 
  
 
Since SEROP is a hybrid cryptosystem, it incurs higher overhead than other 
pure symmetric key security schemes. Figure 5.5 shows the Normalized Routing 
Overhead as a function of pause time. The increase of mobility also increases the 
amount of routing overhead. The number of routing packets generated by SEROP and 
CHAMP increases as the number of data sources increases. Generally, SEROP 
produces a moderate increase of normalized routing overhead as shown in figure 5.6. 
However, this is usually the price to pay for the preferred security levels and is an 
affordable routing overhead.  
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Figure 5.5a Normalized Routing Overhead vs Pause Time 
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Figure 5.5b Normalized Routing Overhead vs Pause Time 
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Figure 5.6a Normalized Routing Overhead vs Number of Sources 
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Figure 5.6b Normalized Routing Overhead vs Number of Sources 
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Figure 5.6c Normalized Routing Overhead vs Number of Sources 
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5.5 Simulation Results for Malicious Network 
 The simulation results shown in the previous section compare the performance 
of SEROP with CHAMP in a benign network. In this section, we perform additional 
runs of simulation to determine the performance of SEROP in the present of malicious 
nodes. Figure 5.7, 5.9 and 5.11 represent the results of first attack scenarios while 
figure 5.8, 5.10 and 5.12 illustrate the results of second attack scenarios, as described 
in the previous section. 
In both scenarios, the percentage of packets delivered decreases as the number 
of malicious nodes increases as depicted in figure 5.7 and figure 5.8. The decreases are 
due to isolation of malicious nodes that were participating in the routing. However, the 
results are encouraging when dealing with malicious nodes, especially in second attack 
scenario. As seen in figure 5.7, SEROP is able to deliver 43.5% of packets successfully 
at pause time of 120 seconds although 50% of the nodes in the network maliciously 
tamper the contents of RREQ. Besides that, the PDR at all pause time drops slowly as 
the percentage of malicious nodes in the network increases from 30% to 50%.  
For the second attack scenario, SEROP delivers more than 80% of the data 
packets at all pause time when 30% of the network nodes are malicious as shown in 
figure 5.8. Furthermore, SEROP achieves more than 65% of PDR at all pause time 






























Figure 5.7 Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Malicious Nodes 
(Malicious Route Request) 
 






















Ratio Figure 5.8 Packet Delivery Ratio vs Number of Malicious Nodes 
(Malicious Route Reply)77 
End-to-end delay of SEROP increases significantly as the number of malicious 
nodes increases as depicted in figure 5.9. On the other hand, figure 5.10 illustrates a 
better delay performance in the second attack scenario as compared to the first attack 
scenario.  
Byte overhead in figure 5.11 is worse than in figure 5.12, due to the frequent 
regeneration of the RREQ, which has been discarded whenever the authentication fails, 
and the contribution from the security overhead. However, the byte overhead for the 
second attack scenario is very low and remains constant even though 50% of the 
malicious nodes are spread over the entire network, as shown in figure 5.12. 



























 Figure 5.9 End-to-end Delay vs Number of Malicious Nodes 
(Malicious Route Request)78 
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Figure 5.11 Byte Overhead vs Number of Malicious Nodes 
(Malicious Route Request) 
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Conclusions and Future Work 
 
After a brief conclusion, we discuss some limitations of our work. We also 
suggest certain possible extensions to our work. They are some aspects of security that 
we have not addressed and could serve as good topics for future research. 
 
6.1  Conclusion 
 The routing protocols proposed for Mobile Ad hoc networks are able to meet 
the basic requirements like dynamically changing network topologies rather well. 
However, security issues have been primarily ignored. MANET routing protocols must 
be secured from the viewpoint of authentication, integrity and privacy. These 
requirements can be partially met by strong authentication and encryption mechanisms, 
digital signatures, etc. Moreover, the protection mechanisms can be optimized for 
every protocol based on the approach taken to routing. 
 This thesis has presented the design of SEROP, an efficient secure routing 
protocol (extension) for mobile ad hoc networks that achieves secrecy of data 
messages and secures the routing operation. The security scheme aims at preventing 
attacks by malicious nodes that intentionally disrupt the route discovery process. The 
protocol also assures a source node that generates a route discovery request is able to 
identify and authenticate the route reply from the destination node. Besides that, the 
scheme also provides optional secrecy protection for data packet. 
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 For simulation implementation in both benign and malicious networks, we base 
our protocol, SEROP, on the basic operation of the Caching and Multi-Path (CHAMP) 
[1] routing protocol. SEROP performs very well in benign networks. It does not reduce 
the packet delivery ratio of the based protocol by more than 2.7% for 10 data sources 
throughout the entire simulation.  Furthermore, it also exhibits low end-to-end delays 
and acceptable routing overhead. Besides that, the SEROP protocol is able to function 
and perform well although 50% of the network nodes are malicious.  
Ultimately, SEROP can be regarded as an effective and practical security 
extension that does not drastically degrade the overall performance of the based 
routing protocol. 
 
6.2  Limitation 
The protocol as compared to symmetric key based schemes, incurs a higher 
overhead in the network since it uses asymmetric keys to ensure the robustness of the 
routing protocol. This is usually the trade off between the preferred security levels and 
the affordable routing overhead. However, this routing overhead can be reduced by 
using short asymmetric keys if the target scenario is only valid for few hours, e.g. a 
meeting. 
6.3  Future Work 
Intrusion detection schemes that analyze traffic profiles to detect intruders 
would be another challenging area to explore. We have considered isolated cases of 
node compromise. It would be extremely challenging to study the case where nodes 
collaborate to bring down the system. Detection of compromised nodes is a very tough 
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